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ABSTRACT 
The effects of capital-raising announcements have long been used as an indicator of increased 
shareholder wealth (Brown & Warner, 1985). Studies on bond announcements for example, 
have been largely inconclusive. However, when effects are measured based on bond underlying 
structure – straight and convertible bonds – then the results are more conclusive (Abdul Rahim, 
2012). Furthermore, issuances around crisis period are expected to result in negative market 
reaction as investors prefer liquidity (Fenn, 2000).  Sukuk are bond-like instruments that are 
issued based on the Sharia guidelines and perceived to be less risky due to their risk sharing 
attribute. Sukuk are issued by the governments and also corporations. Sukuk can either be debt-
based or equity-based. The former resembles the conventional bond and the equity-based Sukuk 
resembles the convertible bonds. It is interesting to ascertain the market reaction to issuance of 
both type of Sukuk. This study determines the wealth effects of Sukuk issuances in Saudi Arabia, 
around crisis period. Sukuk issues have steadily increased in Saudi Arabia and it is the second 
largest issuer in 2015 (Zawya, 2015). The market reaction to corporate Sukuk issuance by 
Saudi firms is yet to be documented and the findings of this study address this issue, especially 
during the crisis period when the risk aversion is high and investors prefer liquidity. The 
BaiPerron (2003) multiple breakpoint analysis was applied to determine the crisis period, 
which was between 2007 and 2010. A sample of 25 events from 18 companies, consisting 
primarily of debt-based Sukuk were sampled for analysis. The findings suggest that the market 
reacts positively and significantly to debt-based Sukuk issuance during the crisis period, 
contrary to the theory that postulates a negative market reaction. Though these findings seem to 
be unique, it is possible that it is a behavioral effect of investors requiring less liquidity 
premium during crisis, contrary to expectations (Chen, et al., 2007; Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986). 
Keywords: Announcement effects, Sukuk, Saudi Arabia, Middle Eastern Islamic Economic 
system 
INTRODUCTION 
his paper assesses the effects of Sukuk announcements for Saudi Arabian issuing firms before 
and during the financial crisis period. Financial development is widely accepted to contribute 
to economic growth (Schumpeter, 1912; Hicks, 1969 and Miller, 1998, Levine, 2005). Saudi 
Arabia is ranked as the global leader in Islamic financial development and growth (Thomson-
Reuters, 2016). Increased firm value contributes to overall economic growth through 
employability (Daunfeldt, Elert, Johannsen, 2014). The type of financing a firm opts for when 
T 
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raising funds for business initiatives is shown to have a signaling effect in the market (Ross, 
1977). Investors react to such announcements by influencing the share prices through their trading 
behavior (Brown & Warner, 1980). Since there is no previous documented evidence of market 
reaction to corporate Sukuk issuance in Saudi Arabia, this study fills the gap. 
In most emerging economies, where stock and bond markets are either non-existent or in 
their nascent stage, the banking system provides the main source of financing investments. As the 
economies develop, the source of financing is diversified with the stock and bond markets 
gradually taking on a more dominant role in the economy. Islamic banking and finance forms a 
significant part of financial development for specific countries. In 2015 for example, Saudi Arabia 
held the largest amount of Islamic finance assets in the world (Thomson-Reuters, 2016). For the 
Middle East, more specifically the Gulf Co-operative Council (GCC) countries1, the introduction 
of Islamic banking and Islamic capital market facilities have provided alternative sources of 
finance for both the sovereigns and corporates alike. In order to determine the overall impact of 
Sukuk on financial development and ultimately economic growth, market reaction to Sukuk 
issuance announcements would be an effective measure. Sukuk have been used successfully as a 
method of resource mobilization for capital market development (Jobst et al., 2008). However, 
Sukuk have also been criticized as instruments that mimic conventional bonds and lack innovation 
(Miller et al., 2007). If Sukuk are different from common bonds, then market reaction is expected 
to be different as well. Therefore, we consider the evidence on the similarities and/or differences 
between the two instruments. Previous studies have shown that differences do exist between the 
two instruments (Safari et al., 2013). However, an empirical test on market reaction to Sukuk 
issuance is expected to provide clarity on whether the Saudi market perceives any differences in 
these instruments. 
The empirical evidence on the wealth effect of bond announcements, is inconclusive in 
general. Documented evidence indicate positive reaction (Harvey et al. 2004), to no reaction 
(Ashhari 2009; Godlewski et al. 2011; Godlewski et al. 2013; Ibrahim & Minai 2009) and 
negative reaction (Arshanapalli et al, 2004; Burlacu, 2000) around the announcement period. 
However, when bond samples are separated into underlying structures (e.g. straight and 
convertible bonds), or regions, then results are more conclusive, that is no market reaction to 
straight bond announcements and negative reaction to convertible bond issuance (Abdul Rahim, 
2012).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the literature on 
Sukuk and bond announcement effects. This is followed by the data and methodology and the 
findings. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS  
The overall research objective is to determine the impact of Sukuk announcements on 
company share price in the Saudi market. Market reaction on the share price of Sukuk issuers 
impacts on firms value, leading to increased employment and ultimately, economic growth. 
Sukuk issuance is a form of financial development. Crisis periods affect financial development 
(Banner, 2001). Hence, the research question investigated is whether market reaction is 
moderated by crisis period and the sample traits such as type of contract, size and tenor of the 
Sukuk. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Sukuk and Bond Announcement Effects  
Studies on bond announcement effects have been mixed and inconclusive in general. 
However, when bonds are separated in terms of underlying structure (straight and convertible 
bonds), then the results are more decisive. Announcements of straight bonds - that are pure debt 
                                                                   
1Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain   
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instruments - do not produce any significant reaction (Eckbo, 1986) whereas announcements for 
convertible bonds - that have both debt and equity elements – result in negative reaction (Abdul 
Rahim, 2012). This implies that markets react to the underlying structure of these instruments. 
Abdul Rahim (2012) analyzed thirty-five studies on convertible bond announcements from 
1968 to 2007 in the United States and documents negative and significant markets reaction. 
Burlacu (2000) and Arshanapalli et al. (2004) also document negative abnormal returns for 
convertible bonds, but only near announcement dates. They suggest that this could be due to 
potential dilution effects that arise from convertibility that may be outweighing any agency or tax 
effects for the convertible bond issuers.  
Hanifa et al. (2014) found no significant reaction from convertible bonds for Malaysia, but 
they only measured post announcement effects and did not discount for the impact of the crisis 
period. For convertible bonds (which are closer to hybrid Sukuk in structure as they have both 
equity and debt attributes) the findings are biased towards negative returns around the 
announcement period. 
Studies on straight bond effects reveal that no significant reaction occurs at announcement 
(Eckbo, 1986; Ashhari et al., 2009; Ibrahim & Minai, 2009; Godlewski et al., 2011; Godlewski 
et al 2013). Alam et al. (2013) suggest that this could be the result of cancelling effects from 
positive reaction due to signaling of strong firm quality and negative reaction from increasing 
bankruptcy and agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
No documented studies have specifically considered market reaction to announcement in 
Saudi Arabia. Although Elian and Young-Taft (2014) do include Saudi issuances within a multi-
country sample (10 issuances from Saudi Arabia), they do not consider crisis period or underlying 
structure. They found a net zero wealth effect based on positive reaction before crisis and negative 
reaction at event date. Since their study does not differentiate between specific country impact, 
the reasons for reaction in Saudi Arabia were indeterminate. 
Godlewski et al. (2014) and Hanifa et al. (2014) considered underlying structure, although 
they do not consider other relevant issues such as crisis period and the impact of different markets. 
Demarcation of underlying structures will provide more useful insights on the market’s reaction 
to their announcements. Godlewski et al. (2014) measure the effects for 8 countries, thereby 
potentially diluting the effects of specific regions on market reaction. Abdul Rahim (2012) found 
that market reaction to capital-raising announcements are different from region to region 
(attributed to corporate culture and orientation (Moerland, 2005)). Therefore, a region-specific 
study is expected to enhance the validity of the results. 
Fenn (2000) asserts that markets move towards liquidity during crisis, hence moving away 
from debt announcements. Thus, reaction to debt-based Sukuk issues may also become negative 
during crisis. Hence, measurement around crisis period becomes more relevant to the validity of 
the results. 
The findings and conclusions documented so far on Sukuk announcements are expected to 
be biased based on the different sample size, different underlying structure and the period of 
study. Previous studies on Sukuk announcement effects around the crisis period are limited and 
varied. All three previous research studies confirm a negative market reaction during crisis (2008 
– 10), whilst 2 studies document positive market reaction after crisis (Alam et al., 2013 and 
Ahmad & Rusgianto, 2013)). Two studies that agree in terms of the selected period of crisis 
(2008-09) give conflicting results: Alam et al., (2013) found a positive reaction whereas Rahim 
& Ahmad (2014) document a negative reaction. 
The wealth effects from Sukuk issuance is mixed, encouraging further review. This study 
is expected to contribute to the literature by providing a pioneering study focused on Saudi 
Arabian corporate Sukuk announcement effects that account for the underlying structure and 
period of issuance, and expected to provide valuable insights to better understand the corporate 
Sukuk market in the country. There is no specific legislation in place for corporate issuance in the 
country, effectively placing Sukuk beneath the issuance of capital market instruments. The Saudi 
Tadawul All Share Index (TASI) is used as a benchmark for testing the abnormal returns. The 
breakpoint analysis for the TASI was found to be similar in breakpoints to the S&P GCC Index. 
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DATA  
The data was mainly sourced from the Zawya Islamic database, DataStream and Islamic 
Finance Information Service (IFIS). The sample comprises of 20 companies covering 27 events 
of Sukuk issuances.  
The data collected was based on the following criteria:  
i. Daily stock returns are used for listed companies that have prices for at least 6 months before 
and one month after the event date.  
ii. Companies that issued multiple Sukuk were considered based on Sukuk programs and not 
tranches of the same program for analysis of maximum effect.  
iii. Multiple issuances from the same companies were only included if events were at least one 
year apart. This is expected to remove any bias that may arise from near singular events.  
iv. Daily share prices along with the index prices around Sukuk issuance date were extracted from 
DataStream.  
vii. The event date is the announcement date or the issuance date as this is the official date when 
the public becomes aware of the Sukuk.  
viii. The event window is 40 days before the event to 10 days after the event. 
The announcement effect is analyzed based on:  
a. The entire period of issuance  
b. Underlying structures, divided into debt and equity  
c. Break-Point periods around the crisis identified in the Bai-Perron (2003) tests, divided into 
pre, during and post crisis  
d. Size and tenor of issuance  
METHODOLOGY  
Breakpoint Analysis 
The Bai-Perron (2003)2 multiple breakpoint analysis was applied to determine the official 
financial crisis3 period for Saudi Arabia. This demarcation of periods will help identify major 
changes in the TASI since there is no prior documented study on the length of the probable effect 
of the global financial crisis in Saudi Arabia. Since the market is expected to react differently in 
and out of crisis, announcement effects are also expected to differ (Ross, 1977; Alam et al. 2013). 
Zarei et al. (2015) found in a recent study that the Bai-Perron (2003) multiple breakpoint test 
identified breaks accurately in their long-run data over 651 months in a four-country study on 
exchange rate time series. They conclude that Bai-Perron (2003) test is a more objective method 
in isolating potential breakpoints as opposed to selecting dates based on perceived changes due 
to news or announcements, and should be used as the initial test prior to subjecting the data to 
any further analysis. 
Event Study  
Event study methodology is well-established as a method of determining wealth effects 
due to specific news in the market (Brown & Warner, 1985). The measurement of abnormal 
returns around announcement date for example, provides information on market reaction to a 
firm’s capital-raising decisions. The market may react positively, negatively or not at all when 
firms raise funds using equity, debt or hybrid securities. Similarly, firms can measure the impact 
                                                                   
2 The Bai Perron (2003) test was selected after considering other breakpoint tests including the Chow test (1960) and the Quandt-
Andrews framework (Bai and Perron, 2003). Quandt (1960), Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) modified the 
original Chow test (1960) to become known as the Quandt-Andrews framework. Bai and Perron (2003) enhanced the Quandt-
Andrews framework using an algorithm to detect multiple unknown breakpoints in a long time-series.   
3 ‘Financial Crisis’ can be understood as a period in which the value of financial institutions and assets fall significantly, often 
prompting investors to sell off assets and depositors to withdraw their funds in panic.   
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of their capital structure decisions on stock price using this approach as well. This study 
determines the wealth effects from Sukuk announcement using the event-study approach. 
Event study requires determining of event date, estimation period and event window. The 
event date is the date of Sukuk issuance. The estimation period is 180 days to 41 days prior to the 
event. Since capital-raising using bond or Sukuk issuance requires the Indonesian capital market 
regulator’s approval, the estimation period and event window is expected to be sufficient for any 
abnormal returns to be observed. The event window is 40 days before and 10 days after the event.  
The Market Model (Sharpe, 1963) is used to determine any abnormal returns as it is shown 
to reduce any cross-correlation that may exist (Brown & Warner, 1985). Abnormal return is 
measured by the difference between the expected return from the market (as measured from the 
benchmark index) and the observed return of the issuing firm. The analysis is conducted using 
‘Event Study Metrics, V1.07’. The Market Model is given as follows: 
 
The alpha and betas are estimated using the estimation period between days -180 and -41. 
Since the Indonesian market is characterised by thin or non-synchronous trading (Pasaribu, 
2009), the OLS estimated beta is adjusted for thin-trading bias using the Scholes & Williams 
(1977) method.  
The abnormal return (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) for each announcement event in the estimation window is 
calculated as: 
 
The abnormal returns are aggregated and averaged for each event day using the following: 
 
The average abnormal returns are tested for significance using a t-test calculated from the 
ratio of the average abnormal return on day t to its estimated standard deviation. The standard 
deviation is measured over the period of estimation (-180, -41) and not the event window. This 
avoids any bias that may result from the announcement effect (Salamudin, et al., 1999). 
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The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) between specific days has been shown 
to provide a more accurate result of the long term effect on stock prices. CAAR is determined by 
aggregating the price changes from investor-induced trades around the event dates. CAAR is 
determined as follows: 
 
t1 and t2 represent the start and end time period of AAR. The expected value of CAARt is 
zero if there is no impact from the stock prices from the event relating to the sukuk issue. An 
initial significance test is conducted for CAAR on each day by: 
 
where 𝛿(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2)) is the standard deviation of the cumulative average abnormal returns 
between days t1 and t2, given as follows: 
 
Where T represents the number of days in the CAAR statistic and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) is the 
variance of the average abnormal returns for the estimation period (days -180 to -41). CAAR 
significance testing uses both parametric (e.g. Patell, 1979 and Boehmer, et al. 1991) and non-
parametric (Corrado & Zivney, 1992 and Cowan, 1992) tests in event studies. However, non-
parametric tests are found to be particularly useful for smaller sample sizes. Therefore, our study 
will rely on non-parametric tests – specifically the Corrado rank (1992) and the Generalised sign 
test (Cowan, 1992) for robustness. 
FINDINGS  
Multiple Structural Breakpoints Analysis  
Using the Bai-Perron (2003) multiple breakpoint analysis, the GCC structural breaks are 
identified based on the both the S&P 500 GCC Composite Index and the Saudi Tadawul All Share 
Index (See Appendix: Table A1 and Table A2), because Saudi Arabia is the major Sukuk 
corporate issuer in the region. Both tests reveal a similarity in breaks from the 3rd quarter of 2008 
to the 3rd and 4th quarter of 2013. This indicates that the financial crisis took effect in 2008 and 
not in 2007, and that the 2013 crisis is probably due to the shale oil law passed in the USA that 
sounded the alarm for prices, as it turned out to be true from 2013 to 2016. This is in agreement 
with the GCC reports about the crisis (Kumah et al., 2010; Hassan & Kholid, 2010). Therefore, 
the fiscal measures taken by GCC member countries slowed down the effects of the crisis in their 
respective economies. The Saudi stimulus packages for the financial sector and the major 
restructuring of Kuwaiti and Emirati corporates seem to have delayed the response to the crisis. 
In addition, the indirect link of GCC countries to the origin of the crisis in the United States also 
possibly delayed the effects of the crisis. The GCC crisis period occurs later than the widely 
publicized 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and is more prolonged (2009 to 2013). 
For the GCC, the markets declined from the first quarter of 2009. The ‘Dubai Debt Crisis’ 
and the Golden Belt Sukuk default in 2009 are documented to have affected the region as a whole. 
Nakheel Sukuk was part of the near-default and challenged the Islamic finance industry’s 
resilience as it would have been the largest Sukuk default in history without sufficient legal 
precedent (Hassan & Kholid, 2010). The Golden Belt Sukuk default in Saudi Arabia affected the 
appetite for Sukuk in the region as well (Van Wijnbergen & Zaheer, 2013).  
The reports show that the GCC did not suffer systemic collapse during the financial crisis 
(Kumah, et al., 2010). The specific period of impact came later compared to the other more 
market-exposed countries.  
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Another reason for the difference in crisis period can be attributed to the decline in oil price. 
Khalifa, Hammoudeh and Otranto (2014) found that oil prices affect GCC markets in total - a 
major part of revenue for major oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, in particular. Hence the 
breakpoints for the GCC are justified as the negative effects of the Dubai Debt Crisis and the 
global financial crisis would have led to prolonged negative sentiment in the GCC markets.  
Based on the results of the Bai-Perron test for TASI indicated in Table 1, the financial crisis 
is classified as follows: 

 Pre-crisis: prior to 2009  
 During crisis: between 2009 and 2013  
 Post-crisis: after 2013  
Table 1: Saudi Tadawul Index (TASI) Structural Breakpoint Analysis Results using Bai-
Perron (2003), Global Information Criteria, LWZ criterion 
 
 
Corporate Sukuk Issuances in the GCC – Total 
Figure 1 depicts firm issuance behavior based on underlying structure, around the crisis 
period. For all corporate issuances between 2003 and 2015, issuer behavior is largely risk averse. 
Firms have opted to spread the risk during the crisis period whilst attempting to maximize profits 
in the pre and post crisis period. Equity-based (Mudaraba (silent partnership)) increased to 52 
percent of issuances during the crisis, although debt-based issuances still made up almost half of 
all issuances. Before and after the crisis, firms issued Ijara or debt-based Sukuk (89 percent). 
Equity-based issuances during the crisis were five times higher than the previous period. In the 
post crisis period, the majority of the issuances revert to being debt-based (Ijara (lease) and 
Murabaha (cost plus mark-up)), making up 55 percent of the issues. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of corporate Sukuk issuance by type for the GCC, between 2001 and 
2015, based on the crisis period  
Source: Data is extracted from the Zawya Sukuk database 
Corporate Sukuk Issuances: Sample  
The distribution of corporate Sukuk issuance for the GCC region since 2001 is depicted in 
Figure 4.7 using the crisis period identified. 
Prior to the crisis, the GCC issued a broad range of Sukuk with the majority of the issuances 
in Mudaraba (silent partnership) (38%); Mudaraba (silent partnership) and Musharaka 
(partnership), all contractually equity-based Sukuk comprised 58% of all Sukuk prior to crisis. 
When combined with Sukuk al Istithmar (also equity-based), they account for 73% of all 
issuances. However, the structures of Mudaraba (silent partnership) and Musharaka between 
2005 and 2008 are effectively debt-based and not equity-based (AAOIFI, 2008). This is because 
of the statements of the Chairman of AAOIFI in late 2007 that the majority of Sukuk issuances 
(including equity-based Sukuk, are not permissible for sale since they are structured as debt-based 
instruments).  
The crisis period identified for the GCC is immediately after the AAOIFI resolutions were 
announced for Mudaraba (silent partnership) and Musharaka (partnership) Sukuk. Hence, this 
period is expected to be characterized by low Mudaraba (silent partnership) and Musharaka 
(partnership) issuance. Equity-based issuances decreased slightly during the crisis to 
approximately 64% of all issuances. Wakala (agency) Sukuk was issued for the first time in the 
GCC, in 2010. The nature of these equity issuances, however, differed from the pre-crisis period. 
Mudaraba (silent partnership) issuance declined from 37 to 10% and Musharaka (partnership) 
declined from 18 to 14%. 
The AAOIFI resolutions had a significant impact on Mudaraba (silent partnership) and 
Musharaka (partnership) issuances in the GCC during the crisis. Does this have an effect on all 
equity-based issuances during the crisis? If so, it might suggest that issuing firms took longer to 
recover from the crisis due to the strict AAOIFI resolutions. The AAOIFI resolutions would have 
encouraged firms to offer debt-based instruments instead. 
A review of issuance between 2013 and 2015 indicates no significant change in the 
proportion of debt and equity issuances. Wakalah issuances increased notably to 20% of the total 
of 73% equity issuances. This time, Mudaraba (silent partnership) and Musharaka (partnership) 
issuances are expected to be in compliance with the substance of the contract they represent.  
Ahmad and Rusgianto (2013) and Alam et al. (2013) suggest a huge demand for asset-
backed securities in the post-crisis. Even ignoring the fact that only specific types of Ijara (lease) 
Sukuk are asset-backed (Ariff & Safari, 2012), Ijara (lease) issuances maintained a 20% share of 
all issuances before, during and after the crisis. Therefore, although investors might have 
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preferred safer investments during and after the crisis, corporates had not increased asset-backed 
issuances as suggested by previous studies.  
Based purely on underlying contracts, the debt-equity distribution (shown in Figure 4.8) in 
the three phases, shows no particular difference. The GCC seems to offer debt and equity in 
proportion, no matter the state of the economy. 
 
Figure 4.8. GCC corporate issuances based on underlying contracts per period Source: Data 
is extracted from the Zawya Sukuk database  
The descriptive statistics appear as follows:  
Table 4.11. Descriptive Statistics for Debt and Equity Issuances in the GCC Based on the 
Crisis Period 
 
When the issuances are considered in the light of the AAOIFI resolutions, then Mudaraba 
(silent partnership) and Musharaka (partnership) transactions are grouped with debt issuances 
and the scenario changes (see Figure 4.9).  
The GCC did in fact issue a majority of debt issues prior to the crisis (83% of issues). 
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Figure 4.9. GCC corporate issuances based on AAOIFI resolutions per period 
During and post-crisis issuance is significantly equity-based. But firms are expected to 
revert to debt-issuance tendencies during the post-crisis period (Eckbo, 1986). Therefore, it is 
probable that firms still had the perception that they were not completely out of the crisis and 
were willing to share the risk with investors for a while longer. Another reason could be that 
Mudaraba (silent partnership) and Musharaka (partnership) issuances are treated as debt-based 
by the market.  
Table 4.12. Descriptive Statistics for the GCC Corporate Issuances Based on AAOIFI 
Resolutions by Period 
 
In the descriptive analysis (Table 4.12), ‘Debt2’ and ‘Equity2’ represent debt and equity 
based on their actual characteristics as highlighted by Usmani (2007) and the AAOIFI resolutions 
(2008). Therefore, prior to 2009 (pre-crisis), ‘Debt2’ includes Musharaka (partnership) and 
Mudaraba (silent partnership) issuances (excluded from ‘Equity2’). The only differences will be 
seen prior to the crisis due to the timing of the resolutions. Debt issuances still remain much 
smaller on average than equity issuances pre-crisis. This is the case even though Mudaraba (silent 
partnership) and Musharaka (partnership) issuances are now categorized under debt. This 
information is further supportive of the argument that these structures are in fact debt-based.  
The GCC is made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The 
corporate issuance market has been growing consistently in the region, although most of the 
growth can be attributed to issuances in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. From Table A1 (see 
Appendix) overall CAGR for the GCC is 38.33% for all Sukuk issuances whilst corporate 
issuances alone have been growing at 46.33% (CAGR). Saudi Arabia has contributed most 
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significantly to the growth, as it is growing at a CAGR of 55% and has issued over half of all 
corporate Sukuk in the GCC. 
Saudi Arabia is the most prolific in corporate issuances and is the only country to have 
issued Sukuk in 2009 for the entire GCC region. Although no specific legislation for corporate 
Sukuk exists in the kingdom, Sukuk issuances have been the most active. Its best year on record 
is 2013 with USD8.8 billion worth of issues, with almost USD6.5 billion of that being equity-
based issues. In contrast, the Malaysian and Indonesian markets reverted to debt-based issues 
post-2013. Furthermore, Saudi Arabian equity-based issues since 2009 are expected to have 
complied with the AAOIFI resolutions, making them significantly more equity-based in their 
payoffs than Malaysian equity issues. Saudi Arabia offers the broadest range of structures in the 
GCC.  
The UAE accounts for 39% of all corporate issuances in the GCC. However, the UAE 
corporate Sukuk market is growing slower than Saudi Arabia (CAGR of 31%). The UAE had its 
largest issuances in 2007, at the dawn of the crisis. No issuances took place in 2009 and issuances 
of USD1 billion were documented in 2010. Since the crisis, the UAE issued only three types of 
classical structures: Ijara, Mudaraba (silent partnership) and Wakala. Dubai in particular, issued 
some of the largest and most popular corporate Sukuk in the market (e.g. Nakheel Sukuk).  
The Dubai Islamic Financial Centre has adequate facilities in terms of guidance rules and 
regulations that allow for corporate issuance to take place centrally. The UAE released a new 
‘companies law’ in March 2015. Amendments that relate to Sukuk allow the formation of an SPV 
by reducing the number of founders required (Article 31, UAE Federal Commercial Companies 
Law). Furthermore, companies in the UAE are no longer restricted to issuance based on their 
leverage. Previously, companies were not allowed to issue Sukuk that exceeded their available 
capital.  
Qatar contributes 7% to the GCC’s total Corporate Sukuk issuances. Qatar has increased 
its issuances since 2012 and although no issuances were made in 2014, almost USD1.3 billion 
was issued in 2015. The Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) issued ‘Law No 8’ in 2012 
that now includes Sukuk as part of its securities definition. In addition, a set of rules for the 
offering and listing of Sukuk and bonds has also been added to the rulebook, detailing license 
procedures and disclosure requirements. No Shari’ah criteria are established, except for the 
requirement of a Shari’ah Board. Almost 70% of all Qatar’s Corporate Sukuk issuance has taken 
place since 2012.  
Bahrain issued its first corporate Sukuk in 2003, followed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 
2004. Bahrain’s most active year was in 2005 when 37% of all its corporate Sukuk issuances 
made it to market. Since then, the only other issuance came in 2013. The regulation for corporate 
Sukuk issuance took a major step forward in December 2013 with the issuance of the OFS Module 
that is included in the CCB Capital Market Rulebook (Volume 6).4 However, this has not 
translated into any improvement in the Bahrain Corporate issuance sector as no issues have been 
recorded since the new legislation came into effect. 
Kuwait had a few corporate issues between 2005 and 2008 without any significant 
issues thereafter. Kuwaiti issues featured Wakala (agency) (USD328 million) in 2011, but 
this has not been repeated. Kuwaiti law governing Sukuk was passed in 2007, and has unique 
features when compared to other legislations in the region. For example, Sukuk are declared 
to represent common share ownership and not indebtedness by the issuer to the Sukuk-holder 
                                                                   
4 http://www.cbb.gov.bh/page-p-
the_cbb_issued_the_regulatory_and_supervisory_module_on_issuing_and_offering_of_securities_and_sharia_compliant_Sukuk
.htm [accessed 03/02/2016]   
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(Article 1). This effectively challenges the issuance of Sukuk that are primarily of a debt 
nature such as Murabaha (cost plus mark-up), BBA (deferred sale), Istisna (development) and 
Salam. Secondly, the regulation does not allow for the incorporation of an SPV. An SPV 
must be registered like an ordinary company, taking in excess of three months to be 
registered. Since the introduction of the 2007 legislation, only two corporate issuances have 
been documented in Kuwait (Wakala (agency) in 2011 for USD328 million and Istithmar in 
2013 for USD44 million). Legislation in Kuwait has probably played a significant role in 
stalling issuances in the market. 
Oman is new to the Islamic banking and finance sector. It introduced licensing for 
Islamic banks only in 2011.5 Oman has had only one corporate issuance to date, a USD130 
million Ijara (lease) Sukuk issued in 2013. 
The GCC has maintained a less complex approach to their Sukuk structures in the post-
crisis era. This is different to the Malaysian region that has opted for more sophisticated 
instruments since the crisis. This probably attests to the confidence of Malaysian issuers 
compared to a more defensive strategy adopted by the GCC firms. 
The Announcement Effects of Corporate Issuances in Saudi Arabia  
The Saudi sample consists of 29 events from 20 companies between 2005 and 2015 with 
sufficient information for analysis.  
Table 5.20  
Descriptive Statistics for Saudi Arabian Sample by Type of Instrument and Size (in USD 
millions) 
Size N Mean Median Std dev Min Max Sum 
ALL 29 631.00 479.94 459.70 106.66 1,866.42 18,298.89 
        
Istithmar (investment) 8 1,153.24 1,133.29 555.74 399.95 1,866.42 9,225.94 
Mudaraba          (silent 
 
partnership) 
6 386.65 426.61 156.03 193.31 533.46 2,319.92 
Mudaraba           (silent 
 
partnership)- Murabaha   
(cost   plus mark-up) 
11 477.55 506.79 230.15 106.66 1039.97 5,253.06 
Wakala (agency) 2 324.99 324.99 176.80 199.97 450.00 649.97 
Wakala  bil  Istithmar 
 
investment agency) 
2 425.00 425.00 35.36 400.00 450.00 850.00 
The information summarized in Table 5.20 indicates that all issues are equity-based, though 
there is variation in terms of structure. The instruments are based on Istithmar (investment) and 
variations of Istithmar (investment) including Wakala (agency) and Wakala bil Istithmar 
(investment agency). The remaining issues are Mudaraba (silent partnership) and Mudaraba 
(silent partnership) hybrids that incorporate Murabaha (cost plus mark-up).  
                                                                   
5 http://www.gulfbusiness.com/articles/insights/oman-islamic-banking-on-the-rise/ [accessed on 08/02/2016]   
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At USD1 billion, Istithmar (investment) issuances are twice as large on average, when 
compared to other types of Sukuk. Wakala (agency) issuances are the smallest at an average size 
of USD325 million. Besides Istithmar (investment) certificates, all other averages are range 
bound and do not differ significantly.  
The average tenor varies based on the type of instrument. The average tenor for Istithmar 
(investment) and Mudaraba (silent partnership) Sukuk is 12 years. Wakala (agency) and its hybrid 
are issued for no more than 5 years. The Mudaraba (silent partnership)-Murabaha (cost plus 
mark-up) hybrid is issued for an average of 7.5 years (see Table 5.21). 
Table 5.21  
Descriptive Statistics for Saudi Arabian Corporate Sukuk Issue by Type of Instrument and 
Tenor 
Tenor N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
ALL 29 9.52 7.00 5.87 5.00 30.00 
Istithmar (investment) 8 12.63 10.00 6.23 7.00 20.00 
Mudaraba (silent partnership) 6 12.00 10.00 9.06 5.00 30.00 
Mudaraba  (silent     partnership)- 
 
Murabaha (cost plus mark-up) 
11 7.55 7.00 2.11 5.00 10.00 
Wakala (agency) 2 5.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 
Wakala     (agency)     bil     Istithmar 
(investment) 
2 5.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 
 
Announcement Effects of Saudi Arabian Corporate Sukuk Issuances: Total Sample  
The AAR and CAAR for the Saudi Arabian Sukuk corporate Sukuk issuances for the 
analysis window (-40, 10) is summarized in Table 5.22. The AAR for days -10 (p=0.097) and 
-3 (p=0.017) prior to the event and day +8 (p=0.009) after the event are negative and 
significant. The AARs for all other days in the analysis period are not statistically significant.  
These results indicate that either information leakage is limited in the weeks leading to 
Sukuk issuance or that the market is slow to react to issuance news. However, closer to 
announcement (day -3), the market reacts negatively and significantly, indicating awareness 
of the pending issuances. Further analysis is required in order to determine the effects of crisis 
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Table 5.22  
AAR and CAAR for the Analysis Window for Saudi Arabia 





AAR        t-stat        
Prob 
 




AAR            t-stat           Prob 
 


































0.000      0.07 
 
0.002      0.66 
 
-0.004    -1.14 
 
-0.001    -0.16 
 
-0.002    -0.65 
 
-0.003    -0.89 
 
-0.002    -0.63 
 
-0.005    -1.56 
 
0.000      -0.03 
 
0.000      0.12 
 
0.003      0.84 
 
-0.003    -0.93 
 
-0.001    -0.18 
 
-0.002    -0.65 
 
0.002      0.57 
 
0.002      0.45 
 
-0.004    -1.15 
0.000       0.07 
 
0.003       0.52 
 
-0.001      -0.24 
 
-0.002      -0.29 
 
-0.004      -0.55 
 
-0.007      -0.86 
 
-0.010      -1.04 
 
-0.015      -1.52 
 
-0.015      -1.45 
 
-0.015      -1.33 
 
-0.012      -1.02 
 
-0.015      -1.24 
 
-0.016      -1.24 
 
-0.018      -1.37 
 
-0.016      -1.18 
 
-0.014      -1.03 
 


































0.002         0.59 
 
0.003         0.74 
 
-0.001        -0.35 
 
-0.002        -0.51 
 
0.006         1.72*  (0.097) 
 
0.005         1.30 
 
0.004         1.09 
 
0.003         0.75 
 
-0.002        -0.44 
 
-0.005        -1.41 
 
-0.003        -0.79 
 
-0.009        -2.54** (0.017) 
 
-0.002        -0.60 
 
0.002         0.61 
 
0.000         -0.10 
 
0.000         0.10 
 
0.003         0.81 
-0.018      -1.02 
 
-0.016      -0.86 
 
-0.017      -0.91 
 
-0.019      -0.99 
 
-0.013      -0.66 
 
-0.008      -0.42 
 
-0.005      -0.23 
 
-0.002      -0.10 
 
-0.003      -0.17 
 
-0.008      -0.40 
 
-0.011      -0.52 
 
-0.020      -0.93 
 
-0.022      -1.01 
 
-0.020      -0.90 
 
-0.020      -0.91 
 
-0.020      -0.88 
 
-0.017      -0.75 
-23 0.005 1.41 -0.013 -0.91 3 0.005 1.47  -0.012 -0.52 
-22 -0.001 -0.43 -0.015 -0.98 4 0.003 0.79  -0.009 -0.39 
1 4 1.07 1 -0.72 5 -0.0 4 -1.27  14 -0.5  
-20 -0.002 -0.48 -0.013 -0.81 6 0.000 0.07  -0.013 -0.56 
-19 -0.001 -0.30 -0.014 -0.85 7 0.004 1.09  -0.010 -0.40 
-18 -0.005 -1.36 -0.019 -1.12 8 -0.010 -2.80*** (0.009) -0.019 -0.79 
-17 0.001 0.14 -0.018 -1.06 9 -0.003 -0.80  -0.022 -0.90 
-16 -0.001 -0.42 -0.020 -1.13 10 0.001 0.42  -0.021 -0.83 
-15 -0.001 -0.25 -0.020 -1.15       
*, **, *** denote significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 acceptance levels respectively. p-values are 
shown in brackets, beneath significant t-statistics using two-tailed tests.  
 
From Table 5.23, for the full period, the CAAR for days (-7, -2) is significant using 
both the rank test (p=0.075) and Patell Z (p=0.055), at the 0.1 level. This indicates that the 
market reacted negatively prior to the announcement and close to the event date. The sample 
is tested around the crisis period next, to determine if this behavior is any different.  
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CAAR Significance Tests for the Full Period - Saudi Arabia 
Event 
N         Windows            CAAR           Pos: Neg 
window 
 
Patell Z              BMP 
 
Rank test          Sign test 
29 (-40…10)             -0.021             
13:16 (-7...-2)                -0.018             
13:16 
-1.50                  -1.12 
 
(0.133)               (0.263) 
 
-1.92*                -1.33 
 
(0.055)               (0.183) 
-1.53                  -0.701 
 
(0.126)               (0.484) 
 
-1.78*                -0.7 
 
(0.075)               (0.484) 
*, **, *** denote significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 acceptance levels respectively. p-values are 
shown in brackets, beneath significant t-statistics using two-tailed tests. 
 
The CrisisPeriod  
The sample had two observations in the pre-crisis period, 14 during the crisis and 13 in the 
post-crisis period. Due to the small number of observations in the pre-crisis era, analysis was 
made only for during and post-crisis periods.  
The AAR and CAAR summary in Table 5.24, indicate significant AAR reaction on day -
6, both during (p=0.054), and post-crisis (p=0.085) at 0.1 probability level. In the post-crisis 
period, there were positive and significant AARs on days -8 and -1, but significant negative AARs 
on days -6, -3, +5 and +8. After the event date, specifically days +5 and +8, significant negative 
market reaction is observed.  
Reaction during the crisis is small, with no net wealth effects determined. However, the 
post crisis period is notably negative with a decline of more than 5% around the announcement 
date alone. The market is averse to the news after the crisis. Negative CAARs are found to be 
significant for day -32 (p=0.061) at the 0.1 level. This implies that post-crisis, information may 
have leaked to the market just over one month prior to issuance.  
Table 5.24  
AAR, CAAR Significance Tests for Saudi Arabia, during and Post-crisis 
 





AAR       t-





AAR      t-stat      Prob 
 





















0.001     0.15 
 
0.003     0.58 
 
0.002     0.37 
 
-0.003       -
0.59 
 
0               -
0.09 
 
0                -
0.06 
 
0.001      0.21 
 
0.001        0.2 
 
0.002        0.5 
 
-0.003       -
0.75 
 0.001          0.15 
 
 0.003          0.52 
 
 0.005          0.64 
 
 0.002          0.26 
 
 0.002          0.19 
 
 0.002          0.15 
 
 0.003          0.22 
 
 0.004          0.28 
 
0.006          0.43 
 
0.002          0.17 
-0.004     -0.76 
 
-0.008     -1.42 
 
0              0.04 
 
0.002      0.32 
 
-0.004     -0.66 
 
-0.003     -0.52 
 
-0.005     -0.87 
 
-0.005     -0.89 
 
-0.008     -1.45 
 
0.003      0.56 
-0.004      -0.76 
 
-0.013      -1.54 
 
-0.012      -1.24 
 
-0.011      -0.91 
 
-0.014      -1.11 
 
-0.017      -1.23 
 
-0.022      -1.46 
 
-0.028      -1.68 
 
-0.036      -2.07*      
(0.061) 
-0.033      -1.78 
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-30 0.004 0.86  0.006 0.42 -0.001 -0.12  -0.034 -1.74 
-29 0 -0.05  0.006 0.38 0 -0.08  -0.034 -1.69 
-28 0 -0.08  0.006 0.35 0.005 0.79  -0.029 -1.4 
-27 0.004 0.92  0.01 0.58 -0.003 -0.45  -0.032 -1.47 
-26 -0.003 -0.56  0.007 0.42 0.002 0.28  -0.03 -1.35 
-25 0.002 0.45  0.009 0.51 -0.001 -0.11  -0.031 -1.33 
-24 -0.002 -0.54  0.007 0.37 -0.003 -0.47  -0.034 -1.41 
-23 0.002 0.34  0.009 0.44 -0.001 -0.22  -0.035 -1.42 
-22 0 0.06  0.009 0.44 0 -0.03  -0.035 -1.39 
-21 0 0.08  0.009 0.45 0.003 0.54  -0.032 -1.23 
-20 -0.003 -0.71  0.006 0.28 0.001 0.21  -0.031 -1.16 
-19 -0.006 -1.31  0 0 -0.001 -0.17  -0.032 -1.17 
-18 0 0.04  0 0 -0.004 -0.63  -0.035 -1.27 
-17 -0.003 -0.73  -0.003 -0.14 0 0.02  -0.035 -1.24 
-16 -0.003 -0.6  -0.006 -0.26 0 -0.03  -0.036 -1.22 
-15 0.001 0.15  -0.005 -0.23 -0.001 -0.12  -0.036 -1.22 
-14 0.001 0.15  -0.005 -0.19 -0.002 -0.32  -0.038 -1.26 
-13 0 0.04  -0.004 -0.18 0.003 0.5  -0.035 -1.14 
-12 0.001 0.25  -0.003 -0.13 -0.005 -0.94  -0.041 -1.3 
-11 -0.003 -0.72  -0.007 -0.26 -0.003 -0.56  -0.044 -1.38 
-10 0.005 1.1  -0.002 -0.06 0.009 1.59  -0.035 -1.07 
-9 -0.001 -0.26  -0.003 -0.11 0.006 0.97  -0.029 -0.88 
-8 0.001 0.12  -0.002 -0.09 0.013 2.16* (0.052) -0.016 -0.49 
-7 0.002 0.5  0 0 0 0.03  -0.016 -0.48 
-6 0.01 2.12* (0.054) 0.01 0.36 -0.011 -1.88* (0.085) -0.027 -0.79 
-5 0 -0.02  0.01 0.35 -0.006 -1.05  -0.033 -0.96 
-4 -0.002 -0.44  0.008 0.27 -0.003 -0.44  -0.036 -1.02 
-3 -0.002 -0.36  0.006 0.21 -0.014 -2.41** (0.033) -0.05 -1.39 
-2 0 -0.06  0.006 0.2 -0.008 -1.41  -0.058 -1.6 
-1 -0.002 -0.42  0.004 0.13 0.013 2.21** (0.047) -0.045 -1.23 
0 0 -0.02  0.004 0.13 -0.004 -0.65  -0.049 -1.32 
1 0.003 0.6  0.006 0.22 -0.003 -0.53  -0.052 -1.38 
2 0.002 0.37  0.008 0.27 -0.001 -0.18  -0.053 -1.39 
3 0.003 0.64  0.011 0.37 0.01 1.73  -0.043 -1.12 
4 0.003 0.58  0.014 0.45 0 -0.04  -0.043 -1.11 
5 0.003 0.62  0.017 0.53 -0.014 -2.41** (0.033) -0.057 -1.45 
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6 -0.003 -0.61  0.014 0.44 0.003 0.46  -0.055 -1.37 
7 0.001 0.3  0.015 0.48 0.007 1.27  -0.047 -1.17 
8 -0.003 -0.71  0.012 0.37 -0.017 -2.95** (0.012) -0.065 -1.58 
9 -0.005 -1.1  0.007 0.21 -0.002 -0.31  -0.066 -1.61 
10 0.006 1.33  0.013 0.4 0.001 0.16  -0.065 -1.57 
*, **, *** denote significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 acceptance levels respectively. p-values are 
shown in brackets, alongside significant t-statistics using two-tailed tests. 
Figure 5.9 shows a slight positive CAAR movement during the crisis for the entire event 
window and a negative drift in the post-crisis period, with significant CAARs determined in Table 
5.25. The table summarizes the period during and after the crisis, for asymmetrical windows. 
During the crisis, positive abnormal returns for the event window (-40, 10) are observed between 
announcement day and day +5, at 1.3%. However, the returns are not found to be significant. 
 
 
Figure 5.9. CAAR movements during and post-crisis for Saudi Arabia  
In the post-crisis period, results are negative and significant. Issuers experienced a 
CAAR of -6.5% for days (-40, 10), significant at the 0.05 level using the rank test (p=0.04), 
the BMP (p=0.032) and Patell Z tests (p=0.03). From a week before announcement to 2 days 
after (-7, +2), a reaction with CAAR of -4.2% is observed. The market perceives equity-based 
issuances as bad news in the post-crisis period. This may be attributed to a few factors, led 
by negative sentiment from Usmani’s statement on the Shari’ah non-compliance of these 
instruments announced just before the crisis (Usmani, 2007). Other reasons include market 
caution on Sukuk exposure due to major defaults and near-defaults as well as size (issuance were 
thirty times larger than Indonesia on average).  
Table 5.25  
CAAR Significance Tests Around the Crisis Period - Saudi Arabia 
Event 
N                             Pos:Neg     CAAR 
window 
 
Patell Z      BMP 
Rank 
Sign test test 
During Crisis     13      (-40...10)     8:06            0.013 
                                    (0...5)           6:08            0.013 
-0.06           -0.04 
(0.953)       (0.971) 
1.16            1.30 
(0.244)       (0.194) 
-0.29           0.61 
(0.774)       (0.541) 
0.98            -0.46 
(0.327)       (0.647) 
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Post Crisis         14      (-40...10)     4:09            -0.065 
                                    (-7...2)          4:09            -0.042 
-2.17**      -2.14** 
(0.030)       (0.032) 
-3.00***    -1.77* 
(0.003)       (0.077) 
-2.05**      -1.58 
(0.040)       (0.115) 
-2.21**      -1.58 
(0.027)       (0.115) 
*, **, *** denote significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 acceptance levels respectively. p-values are 
shown in brackets, beneath significant t-statistics using two-tailed tests. 
5.4.3 Discussion  
The market reacts positively during the crisis period and negatively in the post-crisis 
period. However, in the latter period, the results are found to be significant around announcement 
day. A few reasons could explain this reaction: negative market sentiment for the instrument; 
market perception that they are convertible bonds; and size of issuance.  
Issuances in this market during and also post-crisis periods are characterized as being large 
and equity-based. The instrument’s link with equity may have raised negative sentiment in Saudi 
Arabia, since the GCC market as a whole experienced significant loss due to equity exposure 
during the crisis (Kumah et al., 2010). Documented evidence indicates that Saudi Arabian firms 
went through a period of loan reclassification and Sukuk default around the crisis period, raising 
concerns of equity and Sukuk liquidity in the market (Hassan & Kholid, 2010). For example, the 
Golden Belt Sukuk default in 2009 was found to have contributed to the negative outlook of the 
instrument for the market (Van Wijnbergen & Zaheer, 2013). The near-default of Al Nakheel 
Sukuk in the same year raised major concerns regarding the risk exposure of the certificates 
(Hassan & Kholid, 2010). The significant negative CAAR’s for the event window and more 
specifically around announcement day (see Table 5.25) support this.  
The market might also have been influenced by the statement of Usmani (2007) that a large 
majority of equity-based Sukuk do not comply with the Shari’ah. In a report published by the 
Oxford Business Group (2008), the statement by Usmani (2007) caused a 40% decline in issuance 
for the first half of 2008 due to Shari’ah compliance issues. This implies that any subsequent issue 
could be perceived as non-compliant, resulting in significant negative reaction near 
announcement day. Therefore, careful vigilance is required in the case of Shari’ah non-
compliance risk in the region.  
Another reason is that the market may perceive them to be the same as convertible bonds. 
Significant negative market reaction is observed for these issuances in global markets (Abdul 
Rahim, 2012; Burlacu, 2000; Arshanapalli et al., 2004). The market may therefore be reacting to 
equity-based issuances as they would react to convertible bonds. This is reasonable since the two 
instruments share common characteristics of both debt and equity. Convertible bonds are 
therefore described as hybrid securities (Abdul Rahim, 2012). Furthermore, a review of the 
sample underlying structures indicates that thirteen of twenty-nine issues were hybrid instruments 
including Mudaraba-Murabaha (silent partnership-cost plus mark-up) and Wakala bil Istithmar 
(investment agency). Therefore, the similarities between the two instruments may have influenced 
the market reaction to be similar. 
Size may also have contributed to the significant negative reaction. Krasker (1986) found 
that abnormal returns are more negative as the size of the issue increases. Therefore, they react 
negatively to larger issues because risk and implications of default cost increases. The average 
size in the sample is larger than USD630 million, compared to that in Indonesia (USD22 million). 
Similar evidence was documented for Malaysian announcements where the market reacted 
negatively to larger issuances as well.  
Saudi Arabia is described as a network-oriented system (Claessens et al., 2000). Therefore, 
we can assume that the negative returns in the post-crisis period may have been even larger than 
observed, had it not been the case. This may have also contributed to the negligible wealth effect 
during the crisis period. 
In summary, the Saudi market probably reacted negatively to equity-based Sukuk issuance 
due to perceived Shari’ah non-compliance, based on statements made by Usmani in 2007. This 
may be compounded by negative sentiments for equity-linked issuance as a result of previous 
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Sukuk defaults and the consequent loss from equity investment. Another factor could be size, as 
the market might perceive increased risk exposure to Saudi’s larger issues. They may also 
consider Sukuk to be the same as convertible bonds because of the similarities between the two: 
markets are known to react negatively to such issues. As a network-oriented system, the market 
may have been protected from a larger negative effect after the crisis. This is supported by the 
small positive CAAR. 
Finally, our study on the wealth effects for this market is unique and contributes to the 
literature in terms of the effects of revealing the underlying structure in the periods around the 
crisis. 
CONCLUSION  
Wealth effects for the Saudi market are determined on equity-based Sukuk issuances only. 
A negligible positive reaction was observed during the crisis period but was not statistically 
significant. However, in the post-crisis period, issuances caused a significant and negative market 
reaction to share price. Specifically, around announcement day (-7, 2), abnormal returns were 
negative (-4.2%).  
Several factors may have contributed to this effect. Most significantly, our findings support 
the notion that the issues were impacted negatively by the statements made by the chairman of 
AAOIFI, Mufti Usmani, in 2007. However, no similar effect can be linked to the Malaysian 
market since they do not follow AAOIFI standards, as does Saudi Arabia. Therefore, from a 
policy perspective, Saudi issuers must be more vigilant with regard to acceptable norms in 
Shari’ah application within the region. Shari’ah non-compliance risk is a significant risk for these 
issuers, specifically with reference to their compliance with the AAOIFI standards.  
Additionally, the market may perceive equity-based issuances to be similar to convertible 
bonds. The market reaction is the same – negative reaction around announcement day – and they 
share common characteristics of debt and equity elements. Literature suggests ‘overpricing’ of 
stocks as the reason why equity issues attract bad news effect. No specific legislation exists in the 
country that distinguishes the two instruments. Sukuk are characterized as similar to all other 
fixed income securities. The absence of specific legislation and a framework for the instruments 
hinders progress. Here again, as in Indonesia, the potential for these certificates has not been 
effectively exploited. The observed Malaysian dominance is no surprise as it is substantially more 
organized, incentivized and well-regulated. 
Issuances in this market may be characterized as being large and for long terms. These 
factors have resulted in negative reaction, primarily due to investors’ buy-and-hold strategy 
(Siddiqui, 2008; Sole, 2008). This implies that if issuers want to signal good news, one approach 
would be that they should reduce the size of the issue and also the duration. This will decrease 
the perceived risk exposure to investors, therefore leading to positive reaction. Other approaches 
would be to increase supply of Sukuk and increase access to liquidity in the case of secondary 
market trading. This will be advantageous since the buy-and-hold strategy is a result of limited 
Shari’ah compliant instruments and the absence of a secondary market for the product. 
For Saudi Arabia, the overall culture and conservatism is expected to increase demand for 
Shari’ah-compliant securities in the long-term. Firstly, specific legislation governing Sukuk 
should be introduced, in order to facilitate the progress of the instrument. Secondly, a Sukuk 
framework that is updated with Shari’ah resolutions from a recognized Islamic finance Shari’ah 
authority should be established. Thirdly, a secondary market for Sukuk trading should be 
promoted to increase holders’ access to liquidity. These changes are expected to lead this market 
already dominating in the Middle East, and make it a more significant global contributor to the 
success of the sector. 
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